Prison inmate dies of apparent suicide
DEER LODGE — State Department of Corrections officials say a 26-year-old Montana State Prison inmate died over the weekend in an apparent suicide.
Officials say Corey Weis was found on the floor of his cell at about 4 p.m. Saturday, following an apparent suicide attempt by hanging. He was taken to the hospital in Deer Lodge , where he later died.
The department issued a news release Monday stating Weis’ death is under investigation.
Weis was sentenced last summer to two years with the Department of Corrections for violating his probation on a criminal mischief conviction for vandalizing buildings and vehicles in Billings in June 2008. The violations included drug use, failure to pay restitution, not reporting to his probation officer as required and not paying supervision fees.
Source:
http://www.greatfallstribune.com/article/20120626/NEWS01/206260313
I truly find it hard to believe that he only received 2 years for those violations. The running habit is more time would be added for new charges. As Senator Hinkle explained in his article what “criminal mischief” consists of and sentencing requirements. ”According to Dept of Correction (DOC) records, Corey was imprisoned for the charge of “criminal mischief”. For him, it was a sentence of two years at MSP. He was not a violent offender. “Criminal Mischief” is a crime defined in MCA 45-6-101, briefly, it is the act of destroying someone’s property without consent. The conviction of criminal mischief is a maximum fine of $1,500 and/or six months in jail unless the property damage exceeds $1,500 then the maximum fine is $50,000 and/or ten years in prison. ” Senator Greg Hinkle
Irregardless Cory Weis only had a year to go. This is not why he killed himself. The reason is stated in the following article about Cory Weis .
“They need to train officers not to bully, threaten, humiliate and endanger an inmates life as they have been doing. As in the case here. They drove this man to it. To throw him in temporary lock-up and tell him that he would be in prison for 100 years because of an accusation that another inmate accused Weis of. This inmate that owed a debt wanted Weis out of the way. Who are these officers to just take an inmates word without investigating if it was even true or not before threatening him with 100 years. The man so hopeless that he strangled himself with his underwear.”
To Read:
http://montanacorruption.org/2012/06/25/another-man-dies-at-montana-state-prison/
It is not really apparent that he was trying to hang himself when he used his underwear. Using a sheet to tie to the bed in a temporary lock down cell, using his underwear with one of the leg holes then rolling like an alligator on the floor till it tightened enough around his throat to strangle him. I am tired of PR and newspapers just glossing over these incidents.
This is not new with staff threatening and endangering inmates. Right now they have endangered a whole segment of MSP and they do not care. They even took things a step further in one of the low units and segregated these inmates out in this unit in front of the rest of the population while they were in lockdown. They are pushing these inmates to loss of hope, causing suicide….or they are pushing them to have a riot so they can have a lockdown facility.
Then you have politicians with this attitude where he belittles the inmates families or the inmates.
Read More:
http://montanacorruption.org/2012/06/23/shame-shame-representative-mike-menahan/
Riot at Max: Montana State Prison
1 This case study is abstracted from “Riot at Max,” the full report on the incident prepared by a seven-member Administrative Inquiry Team organized by the National Institute of Corrections at the request of the State of Montana.
On Sunday, September 22, 1991, inmates of the maximum-security compound (“Max”) of the Montana State Prison (MSP) rioted for several hours. Five inmates were killed and several were seriously injured. Five staff members were trapped and held hostage in a shower area for the duration of the riot.
A riot at Max originating in the yard was planned at least as far back as late July 1991 and likely was being actively considered as early as May or June. Inmate discussion of a Max riot was common by the first days of August 1991. Inmate interview data were consistent with the conclusion that almost all of the inmates in the Max building knew that a serious riot was imminent and that it would start in the yard. Not all of the inmates knew the exact details of the plan.
Beginning of the Riot At approximately 10 a.m. on Sunday, September 22, Max’s five floor officers, including the sergeant, began to “bring the yard in.”
One of the three fenced exercise areas (“cages”) of the East Yard was empty, and one of the three West Yard cages held a single inmate. The other four cages each contained three inmates. The officers moved the three inmates in the middle cage of the West Yard through the middle cage gate and brought them back into the Max building through the yard door, leaving both the cage gate and yard door open.
As the floor officers took the three inmates back to C-block, nine of the ten inmates left in the West Yard cages broke off pieces of fence in four separate locations, allowing all nine inmates to gather in the center cage on the west side. (For a substantial but unknown period of time before September 22, four portions of the fence had been prestressed by being worked back and forth.) Because the gate to this cage and the yard door to the west side of the Max building itself had been left open,the inmates had clear access to the inside of the building, and all nine hurried in, rushing the west unit control cage. A few split off and ran toward the east unit control cage (the satellite control cage). Two inmate orderlies were working in the corridor, and the two sliding corridor doors had been left open. The inmates from the yard used plastic buckets filled with sand for putting out cigarettes to jam both doors open. They now had control of the corridors and floor area around both control cages; however, they could not get onto any of the six living units (“blocks”).
Almost immediately, the inmates grabbed metal fire extinguishers and portable telephones and began attacking the two control cages. They soon broke the plate glass glazing that protects the polycarbonate security material (Lexan). When this glazing shattered, the control cage officers believed that the Lexan was giving way and that they were about to be taken hostage. The officers in both control cages now climbed ladders that lead to escape hatches on the roof. The west unit control cage officer had locked the five floor officers into C-block. These officers observed the inmates build fires from inmate clothes and blankets and move them against both control cages. The fire at the main control cage (west) was extinguished by automatic sprinklers, but the fire at the satellite (east) cage burned intensely against the cage door and window, melting an area of the window in the control cage door. Inmates then apparently used a broom handle to make or enlarge a hole in the partially melted window and reached through this hole to the control cage keys, which had been left in the inside of the door lock. Once the inmates were inside the two control cages, they had access to every living unit and cell in the building.
Initial Emergency Response
Conditions in Max were deteriorating rapidly. Water on the floor was ankle deep in some places, and smoke from the fires was getting thicker in the building. The smoke evacuation system was inoperative. Part of a sophisticated fire alarm system that included both the command post power override switches for the control consoles and an intrusion alarm system that monitored the status of the building’s three roof hatches and three external doors, it had been broken for months, but security staff had not been notified of the problem.
When the shift commander heard that two officers were on the roof of Max, he detailed available staff to the Max compound. Some of the responding officers helped the control cage officers leave the roof. By the time the officers got down from the roof, about 10 minutes after the riot began, smoke was coming out of the roof escape hatches. The control cage officers confirmed that the sergeant and the four floor officers were locked in C-block and safe at least temporarily. The shift commander then radioed the staff surrounding the Max building to report back to the command post. At about this time, administrative notifications were begun, starting with the warden.
Before they received the order to return to the command post, the officers around Max had heard an inmate yelling that the inmates were trying to break into the control cages and that if they did so, the protective custody (PC) inmates would all be dead.
Staff observed one PC inmate in his cell appearing bloody and beaten, an inmate trying to break into a counselor’s office, and inmates beating on the control cage windows with mop handles and other instruments. When the group of staff reported back to the command post, they believed the floor officers were in one of the lower C-block cells.
The first top administrator to arrive was the associate warden (AW) for treatment. He did not assume command of the institution but worked in parallel with the shift commander, concentrating on events inside Max. The AW directed two staff members to take an AR–15 rifle and a .357 revolver, go to the lower level of C-block in Max, break out a window of the cell where the floor officers were hiding, and use the weapons to cover their escape. The two officers broke out a window in lower C–7, but the cell was empty. Inmates in an adjoining cell wrote a note to the officers saying that the staff members were in the lower C shower room, which has no external window. Two other officers were sent to the basement crawl space beneath the Max building. They found water and smoke problems on both sides of the building and heard screaming and hollering coming from the east side, whereas the west side was relatively quiet.
At about this time, staff around the building heard inmates screaming that the inmates had taken over the control cages. One inmate wrote a note saying that all of the inmates were out. These events appear to have occurred some time between 10:30 and 11 a.m. The warden arrived at approximately 10:40 a.m. and went to the command post. He waited until the shift commander had a few free moments to brief him, then assumed command clearly and decisively. Shortly after 11 a.m., the warden asked for blueprints of the Max building and directed the assistant commander of the Disturbance Control Team (DCT) to meet with his team leaders and other necessary staff to develop a preliminary plan for retaking the Max building.
At about this time, a sergeant in the command post succeeded in reaching an inmate in one of the control cages by phone. The inmate demanded that the inmates be allowed to meet with the media and told the sergeant that they would throw a letter over the fence to the media and that they had control of the officers and the PC inmates. MSP’s single trained hostage negotiator was not yet on the scene. Eventually, however, the negotiator replaced the sergeant and negotiations continued intermittently throughout the incident, providing additional information about conditions and events inside the Max building. The negotiations held out the potential for resolution without force and were later used as a diversion to help cover the approach of the DCT assault team.
At approximately 11:15 a.m., the warden assigned a captain to contact the state cabinet secretary and keep his office briefed. At 11:20 a.m., the negotiator called the inmates, telling them that it was difficult to reach the media because it was Sunday. At 11:45, the inmates called back, demanding that correctional officers move away from the building and fence outside Max or they would bring up a correctional officer hostage and cut off his head. Ten minutes later, the negotiator told the inmate on the phone that media people would be brought in to speak with the inmates if staff could surround the building and contain the incident.Most of MSP uses low-band radios, and the prison authorities were concerned that the inmates in Max could monitor these. The warden ordered all available high-band radios to be collected and distributed to key staff members, who were assigned code names.
Disturbance Control Team Retakes Max
By approximately noon, the rest of MSP had been locked down. Medical facilities had been checked and readied for emergency cases. A physician was standing by, ambulances had been requested, and the first ambulance had arrived at the institution. Towers had been double posted and additional high ground spotters and/or snipers had been deployed.
The DCT assistant commander returned to the DCT assembly and dressing area in the armory as additional DCT members continued to arrive, were briefed, and outfitted themselves. DCT had established their plan for retaking Max. They planned to use an institution fire truck to carry the team to the back of the building, where they would enter through the back door. As a diversion, they planned to introduce a staff member into the Max compound with a video camera and tell inmates that it was a media person. In preparation for this plan, an institution fire truck was driven to the warehouse, where most of its equipment was removed so it could carry the team.
In the meantime, the command post received a report that a beaten and bloody inmate had been seen at the Max sally port. The negotiator called the inmates and asked to arrange the removal of the injured inmate, offering to turn off the water to the automatic sprinklers. The inmates on the phone denied the request and repeated their demand to communicate with the media. They also said that lights were failing and ceilings were coming down in the building because of the water. The warden’s decision to assault Max appears to have followed the inmates’ refusal to negotiate over the injured inmate’s release. In preparation for the assault, radio call signs were reviewed and confirmed and airspace over the prison was restricted. DCT was reminded to move directly to C-block, where the staff hostages were believed to be held. The warden, who had previously agreed with the secretary’s office to clear any actions that might be life threatening, used the open briefing line between MSP and the secretary’s office to discuss the impending start of the assault. The secretary (and through him, the Governor’s office) had been in regular contact with the warden and by then was well aware of the broad parameters of the plan.
The plan was put into action at approximately 1:10 p.m. The negotiator called the west control cage to inform the inmates that a media person was coming in to take pictures. Then, the acting director of the Corrections Division, who had been onsite for some time but was unknown to the inmate population, was given a video camera and went into the Max compound. However, the DCT team was unable to effect an entry as planned. When they got to the back of the building, they were unable to locate the proper key on the emergency key ring. They also found that the inmates had used belly chains, padlocks, and other restraints to barricade the doors. Even the proper key would not have allowed a quick entry. The backup plan involved going down from the roof and in through the exercise cages in the Max yard. When DCT members got onto the roof they found this was unworkable because the inmates had also chained shut the yard gate door. The team pried open the roof escape hatches, which had also been barricaded, and threw small pyrotechnic tear gas canisters into the west and east control cages. Entry teams, heavily armed and wearing gas masks, went down the ladder into the west control cage.
As members of DCT entered the cage, they realized that inmates on the loose in the west side of Max were unaware of their presence. When sufficient DCT officers were in the cage, they went directly to C-block, ordering all inmates encountered to strip and lie down in place on the floor. Unarmed DCT members secured the inmates with flex cuffs under gun coverage from other DCT staff. DCT reached the lower C-block shower room without meeting inmate resistance and found the five staff hostages still locked in but physically unharmed. The tear gas was too thick to escort the five hostages, who did not have gas masks, to the front door of Max, and the sally port area inside the front door was also barricaded. DCT members retreated to C-block with the staff hostages and took them out through the roof escape hatch of the west control cage.
Inside Max, the DCT members regained control of the building by securing one block at a time. They encountered no inmate resistance. The only incident of note occurred when a DCT member fired a warning shot with his revolver into the cell door of an inmate who was not complying. That was apparently the only shot fired on the day of the riot. Inmates told DCT members clearing the west end of C-block that PC inmates had been killed. Moving to the east side, the officers found four dead inmates lying on lower D-block and one on upper D-block, along with a surviving PC inmate in very serious condition with a cut throat and another who had barricaded himself into his cell. All indications are that DCT quickly recognized the importance of maintaining the integrity of the crime scene and identified a command-level staff member to secure the scene. DCT found two other PC inmates unharmed in the unit laundry room. These inmates had used the washer and dryer to barricade the door and had protected themselves by spraying marauding inmates with laundry bleach. Another inmate was found badly beaten, but alive, just inside the front door.
Staff Retaliation
As DCT finished the job of taking control of the remaining areas of Max and searching them, DCT members stripped and flex-cuffed the inmates on each block. The inmates from a block were then taken out in a group to the front door of Max and handed over to the restraint team waiting outside. Inside Max, groups of inmates secured by flex cuffs lay on the floor under DCT gun coverage. Most were naked. The corridors were filled with water, smoke, and tear gas, and the floors were thick with broken glass from various shattered interior windows. As DCT officers led groups of mostly naked inmates to the front door, many suffered glass cuts on the bottoms of their feet. Inmates
alleged that DCT officers beat, kicked, or used batons on inmates who were in restraints and offering no resistance. A substantial number of inmates were treated later that day for injuries other than cuts to the feet. Outside Max, a sergeant had been assigned to assemble and coordinate a restraint team. By the time DCT entered Max, this group of officers had grown to 60 or 70 in number. The warden himself led the restraint team as they ran into the Max compound in a double line that assembled on either side of the front door of Max.
Inmates referred to this group of staff as the “gauntlet.” The Administrative Inquiry Team2 received numerous, consistent inmate allegations that the inmates exiting Max, naked and handcuffed behind their backs, were forced to run through this gauntlet while the officers in the double receiving lines hit, kicked, tripped, or swung batons at the inmates. Subsequently, three separate staff members verified that handcuffed inmates coming through the gauntlet were in some cases kicked, punched, or hit with batons.
The inmates were then taken to “No Man’s Land” (a yard area under gun coverage from towers). They were placed face down on the ground, handcuffed behind their backs. The small number of inmates still dressed were stripped at this point, and flex cuffs were replaced with steel handcuffs. Inmates alleged staff abuse also took place here, primarily in the form of staff kicking inmates as they lay on the floor. Two of the three staff that confirmed the abuse in the gauntlet also confirmed the abuse of inmates in No Man’s Land. Inmates were on the ground for 6 to 7 hours, until they were moved to the Reception Unit between 8 and 9 p.m. Approximately 55 inmates were secured in Reception.
Treatment of Inmates After the Riot
The warden made sure that medical staff were onsite and mobilized before the assault on Max took place. As inmates came out of Max after the riot, gurneys were brought up near the building’s front door, and very seriously injured inmates were put on the gurneys and promptly taken to area hospitals. Inmates with less serious injuries were taken from No Man’s Land to the infirmary. Of these inmates, the five or six most seriously injured stayed in the infirmary and the others were treated and then returned to No Man’s Land.
The short-term stepdown plan, arrived at in the late afternoon and evening of September 22, included the decision to move the new intake inmates out of the Reception building and use this unit for the 50 to 65 displaced Max inmates. The institution would remain on total lockdown for the near term. A long-term stepdown plan was formed in the following weeks. Max inmates held in the Reception Unit alleged that they were subjected to the following abuses for the first several days:
● Neither clothing nor mattresses were provided, and the inmates were denied hygiene items (e.g., toothbrush, toilet paper, tissues) and showers.
● Inmates were fed only two meals a day.
● CapStun (pepper spray) was used on inmates who refused to talk with the attorney general’s investigative staff.
● Inmates were denied access to phones, mail, visitors, legal material, and legal counsel for 3 weeks.
● Some inmates were left naked and hog-tied on the floor for extended periods.
Official inquiry corroborated many of these allegations. The Reception Unit log confirms that the Max inmates were left naked and without mattresses for 4 to 5 days, although they did have blankets. The log first mentions towels, which would allow the inmates to wash in their cells, 4 days after they were moved to Reception. Showers appear not to have been allowed until October 15, more than 3 weeks after the riot. Inmates were fed two meals a day, consisting mainly of cold sandwiches, primarily because of the complete lockdown. Without inmate workers in the kitchen, MSP was unable to produce regular meals. Even the treatment staff was put to work making sandwiches in order to feed the institution’s 1,100 inmates, and the improvised kitchen staff worked 12-hour shifts.
The Administrative Inquiry Team found that the Max inmates held in Reception were not allowed phone calls, visits, recreation, personal possessions, or legal materials. Furthermore, the Reception Unit log reflects no attorney visits or phone calls to any Max inmate prior to October 4 and only a few legal calls or legal visits during the remainder of the 3 weeks they were held in Reception. During the week that the Administrative Inquiry Team was onsite, the attorneys of a few inmates from Max petitioned the court, claiming that the inmates essentially were being held incommunicado. The court directed MSP to allow these clients to see their lawyers immediately for unlimited lengths of time during working hours Monday through Friday.
The inmates’ most serious allegation was that several inmates were hog-tied naked and left in that position for a long period of time. The Administrative Inquiry Team learned that the Max inmates began to be noisy and verbally abusive by September 27, after which the Reception Unit log includes intermittent entries about groups of inmates becoming loud or shouting obscenities. Management regarded this activity as a serious threat of further violence. The warden met with four of his top staff members to decide how to respond. They concluded that they had to do something preventative and decided to place six inmates the staff had identified as ringleaders in full restraints for 24 hours. The top managers understood full restraints to mean using handcuffs and leg irons to hog-tie someone naked on the floor. The MSP policy statement on use of restraints defines “full restraints” as “the use of handcuffs with belly chains and leg cuffs.”
DCT was assembled in case there was strong resistance from the inmates who were to be placed in full restraints. The six inmates were stripped, hog-tied, and left naked on the floor of their cells with instructions not to move or struggle against the restraints. The application of the restraints began shortly after 9 p.m. on October 9. None of the inmates put up any serious resistance, and DCT left the unit shortly after 10 p.m. The restraints were initially left on for between 5 and 7 hours and after that were removed for 10 to 15 minutes at approximately 3-hour intervals. During one break, shortly before noon the next day, October 10, the restraints were apparently removed for more than half an hour to allow the inmates to eat.
After about 23 hours, five of the six inmates were released from the hog-tie position. One of the inmates had wriggled in order to get his hands below the level of his buttocks. He was reminded that he had been told not to move or change position and was left hog-tied for an additional 24 hours. When the physician member of the Administrative Inquiry Team examined four of the inmates involved, more than 2 weeks after the restraints had been removed, he found substantial handcuff wounds and indication of probable injury to superficial nerves on the hands of all four inmates. His prognosis was that the handcuff skin wounds would heal with no greater residual injury than superficial scarring and that any impairment of nerve function would probably not be irreversible. However, because a possibility of permanent nerve damage still remained, he recommended a neurological consultation for each of the inmates who complained of numbness in their hands.
The Reception Unit log also shows other incidents in which inmates were chained, put in restraints, and/or had their coveralls taken from them. Nothing indicates that these inmates were suicidal. In these cases, various requirements of the MSP policy statement on restraints were violated. Mandatory reports were not written, medical and security checks were not performed and/or were not logged, and treatment staff were not consulted.
Staff Support Services
Members of the prison’s treatment and counseling staff provided psychological screening for staff on the day of the riot.
The five staff taken hostage and the two staff members who had escaped at the beginning of the riot were seen first, followed by all DCT members and any other staff member who had observed the bodies of the dead PC inmates or the murder scene, or who gave any indication of being traumatized. Every staff member sent for psychological screening was seen at least twice. Approximately 1 week after the riot, the treatment staff organized a meeting for staff families.
At this meeting, spouses were able to express their fears that a husband or wife would be killed in the prison, and feelings about the inmate deaths and the staff hostages were also explored. Due to heavy publicity in the small towns and rural area surrounding MSP, no one could avoid the topic, including young children. Thus, the meeting also gave some attention to how to discuss something like the riot with young children. The staff who had been held hostage, including the two who escaped initially, were away from work for approximately 3 weeks, during which they received regular counseling. When they returned to work, they did not go back to Max, but were assigned to positions where they would not have contact with inmates. A group counseling session was established to allow them to talk with each other about their adjustment.
The treatment and counseling staff wrote several memos that were distributed to all staff. These memos dealt with topics such as grief, death, fear, and hostage situations and identified some of the more frequent kinds of problems that staff or family members might be experiencing, thereby giving staff license to acknowledge those problems.
Lessons Learned
1. No matter how a “supermax” (super maximum-security) unit is built or operated, riots and inmate takeovers are never impossible.
2. If the tone of an institution is angry and harsh prior to a disturbance, the disturbance itself may quickly turn brutal and bloody.
3. No prison should operate without an emergency plan.
4. A committed and dedicated prison tactical team may be extremely effective, even without the benefit of sophisticated equipment or extensive training.
5. Chronic lapses in following day-to-day security procedures and security policies can render an otherwise relatively secure facility extremely vulnerable.
6. Potential warning signs and other intelligence suggesting a serious incident is imminent must be carefully evaluated, even though any institution will generate its share of false rumors about impending problems.
7. A perceived unreasonable delay in providing information and access to the media can quickly turn both the news coverage and the editorial comment about a correctional emergency more negative than necessary.
8. Thoughtful attention to the needs of traumatized staff and staff families in the aftermath of a major emergency will be much appreciated. Such efforts may be effective even in the absence of prior planning or prior recognition of their importance.
9. Strong leadership from the person in charge may be the most important need during a major prison emergency.
10. It is important that postemergency measures not be perceived as punitive by those inmates who have not taken part in the disturbance.
11. Staff retaliation after an emergency is more likely when staff professionalism is questionable before the emergency and when positive, hands-on leadership from administrators and middle managers is lacking.
12. Maintenance problems with security systems must be widely communicated to security staff.
13. All staff involved in an emergency situation must write individual, detailed reports before completing their tour of duty, and a supervisor or manager should review each such report for adequacy and clarity and either document approval of the report prior to relieving the staff member or return the report to the staff member for additions or corrections.
14. In the aftermath of a major emergency, inmates’ basic needs and rights (e.g., clothing, food, attorney visitation) should be met as quickly as is practically consistent with security needs.
15. Protective custody inmates should not be in regular contact with administrative segregation and disciplinary inmates, particularly within a maximum-security unit.
16. Maximum-security inmates should not be allowed regular access to outside exercise areas without visual supervision from staff.
17. A tactical team’s contingency plans for assault or hostage rescue will seldom go exactly as planned. Unanticipated problems are the rule, not the exception. The team should have a “plan B” in case “plan A” proves unworkable, and both plans may need to incorporate great flexibility.
MSP had serious systemic problems long before the riot. Staff salaries were unrealistically low (the beginning annual salary for a correctional officer in 1991 was $15,563, at least 15 percent below the national average), staff turnover was somewhat high (just over 19 percent in fiscal year 1991), and staff training was inadequate (there was no separate item in the budget for training).
Correctional officers were not entitled to hazardous duty retirement or line-of-duty death benefits, although both of these accrued to state law enforcement officers. Critical policies and procedures were inappropriate, contradictory, or lacking (for example, MSP had no use-of-force policy) and other policies were regularly ignored. Security was inconsistent and, in many cases, far from rigorous. Perhaps most importantly, staff had no shared understanding of the institution’s mission, goals, or values.
Staff professionalism at MSP was poor. Some staff regularly swore at, with, and about inmates. Taunting and demeaning of inmates was common, and little supervisory accountability was enforced at any level. Inmates housed in Max at the time of the riot described a pattern of physical abuse by staff; inmates who had been housed in Max during the years immediately preceding the riot but were no longer housed there corroborated this complaint. The inmates had little redress, as MSP’s inmate grievance system was unmanaged and ineffectual and lacked credibility with the inmate population. The inmate disciplinary system also was poorly designed and inconsistently administered. Medical services were another source of widespread dissatisfaction and anger among the inmates, exceeded perhaps only by the parole board process. Overall, conditions within Max could only be described as harsh.
Protective custody (PC) inmates, who were used as the unit orderlies, were in frequent contact with Max inmates. Some staff were careless about maintaining confidentiality regarding inmate informants, even teasing inmates about being “snitches” or “rats.”
Some inmates reported that “getting the snitches” was a primary goal of the riot from the outset. Others said that the initial plan was simply to take over the west side of Max and the east side if possible, perhaps taking some floor officers hostage in the process. According to this view, the inmates did not expect to gain access to the control cages and the murders of the PC inmates were crimes of opportunity.
Source From:
http://static.nicic.gov/Library/020293.pdf
pages 277-287
- They talk about lessons learned, but there are no specific recommendations. Montana we are back to pre-riot days of 1991. Staff are treating these inmates the same way. They belittle them. Female officers stand around and discuss inmates cases in hopes to stir something up. Some of the female officers are prancing around trying to gain inmates attention, which there is a high problem with staff/inmate sex. Female officers screaming at them, which of course is hard on any man inside of prison or out, plus there is no need of that if you run a prison facility correctly. They have put inmates in danger. They have grievances with medical and the parole board. They have an issue with these classes that they throw them under, some not even designated to take them. Keeping these inmates in longer and longer. They are taking every thing away from them. Leaving these inmates with little hope.
- Department of Corrections is driving them to do this again, they don’t care if they die of suicide or if they riot. If they riot they are looking for a $5 million dollar grant. Everything is about money. This time it is not just MSP, it is every prison and every re-entry program in the state of Montana that is upset with this corrupt system. They are coming out of the woodwork like cockroaches. Families are sick and tired of DOC treating them like they are nothing more than garbage. Families have not broken the law. They are bankrupting families. Montana has a very high incarceration rate. That is a sure sign guarantee that there is corruption in the DOJ and Judicial System and DOC. Power and money.
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